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I. INTRODUCTION 
Codification was clearly in the air when Minnesota decided to 
recodify their criminal code in the 1950s.  Wisconsin completely 
revised its criminal code in 1955;1 Illinois revamped its code in 
1961.2  The granddaddy of all criminal codifications, the Model 
 
 †   Resident Adjunct Faculty, William Mitchell College of Law, and Assistant 
Minnesota State Public Defender.  Thanks to Wendy Bratten for her research and 
writing.   
 ††  J.D. Candidate, William Mitchell College of Law, 2013. 
 1.  Alfred P. Murrah & Sol Rubin, Penal Reform and the Model Sentencing Act, 
65 COLUM. L. REV. 1167, 1167 (1965). 
 2.  Terri L. Mascherin et al., Reforming the Illinois Criminal Code: Where the 
CLEAR Commission Stopped Short of Its Goals, 41 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 741, 742 (2008). 
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Penal Code (MPC), was promulgated in 1962. 
In revising its code, Minnesota took a substantially different 
track than the MPC.  The drafters of the MPC intended to 
revolutionize criminal law; the Minnesota codifiers were trying 
something less controversial but perhaps equally difficult: they were 
trying to make sense of Minnesota’s Criminal Code.  To a large 
extent, they succeeded.  The new criminal code was more coherent 
and fit better into Minnesota’s overlying statutory scheme.  But the 
decision to revise rather than revolutionize created problems.3 
This article briefly describes the history of the revisions to the 
Minnesota Criminal Code and its relationship to the Model Penal 
Code, while making tangents into the history of the State of 
Minnesota when helpful. 
II. CRIMINAL LAW BEFORE MINNESOTA BECAME MINNESOTA 
There were crimes, criminals, and criminal law before 1963; in 
fact, there were crimes, criminals, and criminal law before 
Minnesota became a state.  The Dakota and 
Ojibwe/Chippewa/Anishinaabe tribes inhabited the territory from 
western Wisconsin to the Missouri River for many thousands of 
years before European exploration.4  (Minnesota translates to “sky-
tinted water” in the Dakota language.5)  Their bands formed a 
political alliance called the Seven Fires6 and were bound by their 
mutual obligation to protect their territory.7 
Native American justice systems were very different than the 
Anglo-American system and frequently did not have written laws; as 
a result, many settlers believed that Native Americans had no laws.  
In fact, the Native American communities had many oral laws, 
traditions, and ceremonies that structured and regulated their 
communities.8 
There are other fundamental philosophical differences 
between Anglo-American law and many tribal justice systems.  For 
 
 3.  See generally Ted Sampsell-Jones, Mens Rea in Minnesota and the Model Penal 
Code, 39 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1457 (2013). 
 4.  MARY LETHERT WINGERD, NORTH COUNTRY: THE MAKING OF MINNESOTA 1 
(2010). 
 5.  Thomas D. Peacock & Donald R. Day, Nations Within a Nation: The Dakota 
and Ojibwe of Minnesota, DAEDALUS, Summer 2000, at 137, 138. 
 6.  Id. at 140. 
 7.  WINGERD, supra note 4, at 1. 
 8.  See CARRIE E. GARROW & SARAH DEER, TRIBAL CRIMINAL LAW AND 
PROCEDURE 9–11 (2004). 
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example, the Anglo-American system differentiates between 
criminal law and civil law; many Native communities did not 
recognize this difference.9  In addition, many tribes treated a 
harmful act as harmful to all of society, while other tribes allowed 
individuals to avenge wrongs they suffered at the hands of others.10 
There is also a substantial difference in the philosophical 
underpinnings of the two systems.  Unlike Anglo-American laws, 
the traditional law of many Native societies was considered to have 
been given by the Creator and to possess a spiritual basis, including 
the duties that stem from those beliefs.  As a result, unlike Anglo-
American criminal laws that exclusively defined prohibited 
behavior, Native laws were both proscriptive and normative.11 
III. THE CREATION OF MINNESOTA AND ITS CRIMINAL LAW 
A. From Territory to State 
The land that would become Minnesota first came under the 
control of the United States government upon passage of the 
Northwest Ordinance in 1787.12  The Northwest Ordinance 
established a government over the Northwest Territory, of which 
Minnesota was a part.13 
On March 3, 1849, the United States Congress passed the 
Organic Act, providing for the territorial government of Minnesota 
and fixing the borders of Minnesota Territory.14  The Act also 
established a bicameral legislative assembly, consisting of a nine-
member council and an eighteen-member house of 
representatives,15 and provided that certain laws of Wisconsin were 
in force in Minnesota Territory.16  Since most of these laws were 
civil in nature,17 it appears that the core of the criminal law existed 
 
 9.  Id. at 4. 
 10.  Id. at 13–16. 
 11.  Id. at 10–11. 
 12.  MINNESOTA LEGISLATIVE MANUAL 1957–1958, at 357 (1958). 
 13.  Id. at 358. 
 14.  Id. at 362. 
 15.  Id. 
 16.  See Laws of Wisconsin Now in Force in the Territory of Minnesota, ch. 
45–73, 1849 Minn. Laws 106–60 (1850).  Wisconsin’s laws provided the basis for 
establishing county courthouses and jails, id. ch. 55; criminalizing certain offences 
against the public health, such as selling rotten food or inoculating with smallpox, 
id. ch. 56; providing for writ of habeas corpus for anyone imprisoned, id. ch. 57; 
and abrogating the common law writ, id. 
 17.  See id. ch. 45–73. 
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1444 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:5 
only in common law form.  The first territorial legislative session 
convened on September 3, 1849, and went about enacting laws to 
supplement those established by the Organic Act.18 
The next major landmark in Minnesota’s history was its 
transition from territory to state.  Henry M. Rice, the delegate to 
Congress from the Territory of Minnesota, introduced a bill for an 
act to authorize a state government for Minnesota in December 
1856.19  This bill would become the Enabling Act and was approved 
on February 27, 1857.20  While the act did not directly concern the 
development of Minnesota’s criminal law—its primary purpose was 
to establish state boundaries and provide for a state constitutional 
convention21—it put in place the structures necessary to establish 
the State of Minnesota and, consequently, the legislative body that 
would create and redefine the criminal law in the state. 
Minnesota’s state constitutional convention was held from July 
13 through August 29, 1857.22  Voters approved the constitution on 
October 13, 1857, and it was submitted to the United States Senate 
in December for ratification.23  At the same time, a bill to admit 
Minnesota to the Union was submitted to Congress.24  On May 11, 
1858, that bill passed Congress and was signed by President James 
Buchanan.25 
The state constitution provided that all territorial laws 
consistent with the state constitution remain in force unless they 
expire or are changed by the legislature.26  Thus the criminal laws 
Minnesota adopted when it became a territory became the laws of 
the new state. 
B. Development of the Criminal Law 
The criminal law in place when Minnesota became a 
territory—essentially the common law, with a few statutory 
additions27—remained largely unchanged for almost thirty years.  It 
 
 18.  Id. at 5. 
 19.  MINNESOTA LEGISLATIVE MANUAL, supra note 12, at 368. 
 20.  Id. 
 21.  THEODORE C. BLEGEN, MINNESOTA: A HISTORY OF THE STATE 221 (2d ed. 
1975). 
 22.  MINNESOTA LEGISLATIVE MANUAL, supra note 12, at 370. 
 23.  Id. at 370–71. 
 24.  Id. at 401. 
 25.  Id. 
 26.  MINN. CONST. sched. § 4.  
 27.  E.g., MINN. STAT. ch. 28, tit. 9, § 83 (1873) (providing for imprisonment 
4
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wasn’t until 1885 that the legislature enacted a full codification of 
Minnesota’s criminal laws.28  The revision, which went into effect 
on January 1, 1886, consisted largely of adaptations of New York’s 
1881 Penal Code.29  Importantly, however, the 1886 Code abolished 
common-law criminal offenses; only acts or omissions criminalized 
by statute were now punishable.30 
IV. REVISING MINNESOTA’S CRIMINAL CODE 
A. The Advisory Committee 
For the next seventy-five years, Minnesota’s Criminal Code 
remained substantially the same.  Changes were made to the 
criminal code, of course, but those changes were not well 
integrated with other criminal provisions or made consistent with 
prior laws.31  By the middle of the twentieth century, change was 
afoot, and not just in Minnesota.  Wisconsin completely revised its 
criminal code in 1955;32 Illinois revamped its in 1961.33 
In 1955, the Minnesota legislature established the Interim 
Commission on Juvenile Delinquency, Adult Crime, and 
Corrections; the commission was tasked “to deal with the broad 
problem of ‘juvenile delinquency, crime, and correction.’”34  One 
of the herculean tasks that commission took on was the revision of 
the criminal code. 
The commission recognized that, while the ultimate 
responsibility for revising Minnesota’s Criminal Code belonged to 
the legislature, the “technical nature of the task” required the input 
of the state’s bench and bar.35  The commission wrote to “all district 
judges and all county attorneys36 asking their opinion of the need 
 
or a fine for mistreating animals). 
 28.  The state constitution provided that all territorial laws consistent with the 
state constitution remain in force unless they expire or are changed by the 
legislature.  MINN. CONST. sched. § 4.  
 29.  ADVISORY COMM. ON REVISION OF THE CRIMINAL LAW, PROPOSED MINNESOTA 
CRIMINAL CODE 9 (1962). 
 30.  MINN. STAT. ANN. § 622.01 cmt. 1 (West 1945). 
 31.  ADVISORY COMM. ON REVISION OF THE CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 29, at 9. 
 32.  Murrah & Rubin, supra note 1, at 1167. 
 33.  Mascherin et al., supra note 2, at 742. 
 34.  Maynard E. Pirsig, Proposed Revision of the Minnesota Criminal Code, 47 
MINN. L. REV. 417, 417 (1963) (citation omitted). 
 35.  ADVISORY COMM. ON REVISION OF THE CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 29, at 5–6.  
 36.  Apparently the commission did not feel the need to ask the opinions of 
criminal defense lawyers.  
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for and the feasibility of revising the criminal laws.”37  A “substantial 
number urged the necessity for revision,” as did the leadership of 
the Minnesota State Bar Association.38 
As a result, the commission invited “the legal organizations 
most concerned [to] designate[] representatives”39 to serve on the 
Advisory Committee on Revision of the Criminal Law.  The 
legislature did not renew the commission in 1961, but Governor 
Elmer Anderson made state funds available that allowed the 
advisory committee to complete its revision and submit it to the 
1963 legislative session.40 
The drafters of the Minnesota Code looked mainly to 
Wisconsin, which had adopted a new code in 1955, and the 
American Law Institute, which was developing the Model Penal 
Code at the time, for guidance.41  The 1961 Illinois Code revision 
also proved helpful to the commission in reexamining the policies 
of its nearly finished product.42 
In reevaluating and proposing revisions to the Minnesota 
Criminal Code, the committee had several main objectives in mind.  
First, it sought to remove inconsistent, duplicative, or obsolete 
provisions.43  Gone, then, was the prohibition against taking more 
than one-eighth of a portion as a toll for grinding grain.44  The 
committee also worked to ensure that the elements of a crime were 
stated in “clear, simple, and understandable terms.”45  The 
committee also believed that it was important to include in the 
criminal code only matters of substantive criminal law, not 
procedural provisions or regulatory measures, and recommended 
transferring these provisions to other chapters.46 
In addition, the committee considered the degree of revision, 
that is, whether to restate the law as it existed or to recommend 
substantive improvements.47  The committee could have left the 
wording of the statutes unaffected and instead simply deleted 
obsolete provisions, removed inconsistencies, and improved 
 
 37.  ADVISORY COMM. ON REVISION OF THE CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 29, at 6. 
 38.  Id. 
 39.  Id. 
 40.  Id. at 5. 
 41.  Id. at 7. 
 42.  Id. 
 43.  Id. at 9. 
 44.  MINN. STAT. § 614.51 (1961) (repealed 1963). 
 45.  ADVISORY COMM. ON REVISION OF THE CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 29, at 10. 
 46.  Id. 
 47.  Pirsig, supra note 34, at 424. 
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classification.48 
But the Committee concluded that merely restating the 
present law would not meet the needs of the present 
criminal code nor the intent of the legislation which 
established the Commission. . . . 
The Committee felt that the revision should reflect 
present-day standards in the science of legislation, the 
progress that has been made in the administration of 
criminal justice, and the improvements which present-day 
standards, experience and practice have indicated are 
need in the substantive provisions of the criminal code.49 
The committee, however, did not want to completely rewrite 
criminal law in Minnesota; instead, it “operated within the 
framework of the existing criminal code.  For the most part, it did 
not undertake to incorporate new criminal offenses.  Rather, it 
restated exiting crimes with such changes and improvements as 
appeared justified in the light of present day knowledge and 
principles.”50 
B. The Model Penal Code 
The limited goals of the advisory committee stand in sharp 
contrast to the ambitious goals of the drafters of the Model Penal 
Code.  The Reporter of the MPC described the three requisite 
inquiries in the study of penal law: 
(1) What behavior ought to be made criminal and how 
should it be defined? (2) What variations in the nature, 
circumstances or results of criminal behavior or in the 
character or situation of the individual offender should 
have the legal consequences of varying the mode of 
treatment of offenders? (3) What methods of treatment 
ought to be prescribed or authorized in dealing with 
offenders; what scope of discretion as to method should 
be vested in administration; and in what agency or 
agencies should such discretion be reposed?51 
The Model Penal Code contemplated “a systematic re-
examination”52 of these broad issues rather than simply making the 
 
 48.  ADVISORY COMM. ON REVISION OF THE CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 29, at 9. 
 49.  Id. 
 50.  Id. 
 51.  Herbert Weschler, The Challenge of a Model Penal Code, 65 HARV. L. REV. 
1097, 1104–05 (1952). 
 52.  Id. at 1130. 
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criminal law more coherent and concise. 
The disparate goals of the two projects are perhaps best 
illustrated by the makeup of the two committees.  The Model Penal 
Code had a “remarkably diverse advisory committee of law 
professors, judges, lawyers, and prison officials, as well as experts 
from the fields of psychiatry, criminology, and even English 
literature.”53  The advisory committee in Minnesota, on the other 
hand, was made up of almost exclusively lawyers and judges (and, 
as far as could be determined, all white men).54  To be fair, 
however, the advisory committee did add diversity and, perhaps, 
special insight into criminal law by including one member who was 
subsequently convicted of murder.55 
C. Changes 
So, what changed?  The title remained the same, descriptive 
and alliterative: “Crimes, Criminals.”56  (The title has since been 
changed but remains alliterative: “Criminal Code.”)57 
One noticeable difference between the 1963 Code and its 
predecessor is the length.  In 1961, the criminal code was 136 
pages;58 after the revisions, it was down to seventy-five.59  The 
reduction in length is consistent with one of the general goals of 
the advisory committee: removing unnecessary provisions (i.e., 
those that were duplicative, inconsistent, invalid, or obsolete).60 
D. Obsolete Provisions 
In its effort to remove unnecessary provisions, the drafters of 
the 1963 revision took certain crimes off the books in furtherance 
of the goal of eliminating obsolete provisions.  Overhauling the 
entire criminal code provided a rare opportunity to rid the law of 
statutes whose utility had long since passed, including those crimes 
that, because of political realities, might be impossible to excise any 
 
 53.  Paul H. Robinson & Markus D. Dubber, The American Model Penal Code: A 
Brief Overview, 10 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 319, 323 (2007). 
 54.  ADVISORY COMM. ON REVISION OF THE CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 29, at 6–7. 
 55.  See State v. Thompson, 273 Minn. 1, 139 N.W.2d 490 (1966); ADVISORY 
COMM. ON REVISION OF THE CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 29, at 7. 
 56.  MINN. STAT. ch. 609 (1965); MINN. STAT. ch. 610 (1961). 
 57.  MINN. STAT. ch. 609 (2012). 
 58.  MINN. STAT. ch. 610–23 (1961). 
 59.  MINN. STAT. ch. 609–23 (1965). 
 60.  ADVISORY COMM. ON REVISION OF THE CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 29, at 9. 
8
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 5 [2013], Art. 12
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol39/iss5/12
 
2013] DEVELOPMENT OF MINNESOTA’S CRIMINAL LAW 1449 
other way.  The committee got it right by eliminating express 
provisions against dueling but missed the mark by maintaining 
fornication as a crime.  Here, a glance at why one crime was 
removed while the other remained. 
1. No Longer a Part of the Code: Dueling 
The prohibition against dueling,61 a practice with a long 
history in the American South,62 made its way into the territorial 
and state statutes of Minnesota.  The practice, “the ritual of retiring 
to a field and firing pistols at one another to satisfy a social insult,”63 
occurred among those of high social standing, much to the chagrin 
of state governments.64  If a man felt insulted, he would challenge 
the offending man to a duel, and that man was then obliged to 
fight or lose his honor and status within the community.65 
The biggest problem with dueling was that it frequently 
resulted in death.  Even a slight insult could result in death, and 
the mode of the duel did not ensure that it was the guilty party who 
received punishment.  Whether or not a duel actually resulted in 
the death of one of the principals, however, the practice 
undermined state authority by substituting a private contest for 
public adjudication.66 
Killing another in a duel that took place within the territory of 
Minnesota constituted second-degree murder,67 the penalty for 
which was life imprisonment.68  Seconds—representatives of each 
party who managed the duel and advised their principals69—of 
either party present at the time a mortal wound was inflicted were 
 
 61.  See generally Warren F. Schwartz et al., The Duel: Can These Gentlemen Be 
Acting Efficiently?, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 321 (1984) (providing a detailed treatment of 
dueling and its social context). 
 62.  Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943, 
968 (1995). 
 63.  Id. 
 64.  Katharine K. Baker, Sex, Rape, and Shame, 79 B.U. L. REV. 663, 700–01 
(1999). 
 65.  Id. at 700.  Newspaper editors were among the most vociferous 
proponents of anti-dueling laws, as their occupations involved leveling insults, and, 
consequently, they were among the most likely to be challenged to a duel.  Lessig, 
supra note 62, at 970 n.79. 
 66.  Lessig, supra note 62, at 969.  “The duel was like a lawsuit where the 
judge, after establishing that indeed there was a wrong, flips a coin to decide who, 
between the plaintiff and the defendant, should be executed for the wrong.”  Id. 
 67.  MINN. STAT. ch. 100, § 24 (1851). 
 68.  Id. § 2. 
 69.  Schwartz et al., supra note 61, at 322 n.4.  
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considered accessories before the fact to second-degree murder.70  
Murder by dueling, then, was simply a specific application of the 
general prohibition against homicide. 
The substance of the nineteenth-century law still remained in 
the early 1960s71 but was removed in the 1963 revision.72  Under the 
1963 Code, “if mutual combat does in fact take place, it will be 
dealt with as a form of assault.”73  Society had sufficiently changed 
so a more general provision could handle dueling. 
2. Still Here: Fornication 
Although dueling is no longer a crime in Minnesota, certain 
sexual behavior still is.  Specifically, “[w]hen any man and single 
woman74 have sexual intercourse with each other, each is guilty of 
fornication,”75 which is a misdemeanor offense.  The current statute 
is remarkably similar to the analogous provision in the 1851 
territorial statutes: “If any man shall commit fornication with any 
single woman, each of them shall be punished by imprisonment in 
the jail, not more than thirty days, or by fine not exceeding thirty 
dollars.”76 
Ten states besides Minnesota currently have statutes 
criminalizing fornication on the books,77 but courts in three of 
these states have declared those statutes unconstitutional.78  While 
 
 70.  MINN. STAT. ch. 100, § 25. 
 71.  See MINN. STAT. §§ 619.46–.50 (1961). 
 72.  Pirsig, supra note 34, at 417–18. 
 73.  Id. at 418. 
 74.  A married woman having sex with a man other than her husband is 
punished under the adultery statute.  MINN. STAT. § 609.36 (2012). 
 75.  Id. § 609.34. 
 76.  MINN. STAT. ch. 107, § 5 (1851). 
 77.  See Georgia (GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-18 (West, Westlaw through 2012 Reg. 
Sess.)); Idaho (IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-6603 (West, Westlaw through 2013)); 
Illinois (720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-40 (West, Westlaw through 2012 Reg. 
Sess.)); Mississippi (MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-29-1 (West, Westlaw through 2012 Reg. 
Sess.)); North Carolina (N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-184 (West, Westlaw through 
S.L. 2013-14 of 2013 Reg. Sess.)); North Dakota (N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 12.1-20-
08 (West, Westlaw through 2011 Reg. and Special Sess.) (criminalizing fornication 
in public)); South Carolina (S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-15-60 (West, Westlaw through 
2012 Reg. Sess.)); Utah (UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-104 (West. Westlaw through 2012 
4th Special Sess.)); Virginia (VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-344 (West, Westlaw through 
2012 Reg. Sess.)); Wisconsin (WIS. STAT. ANN. § 944.15 (West, Westlaw through 
2013 Wis. Act 9) (criminalizing fornication in public)). 
 78.  Georgia (In re J.M., 575 S.E.2d 441 (Ga. 2003)), North Carolina (Hobbs 
v. Smith, No. 05 CVS 267, 2006 WL 3103008 (N.C. Super. Ct. Aug. 25, 2006)), and 
Virginia (Martin v. Ziherl, 607 S.E.2d 367 (Va. 2005)). 
10
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the statute remains in the criminal code in Minnesota, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court has noted that “police and prosecutors 
generally have considered [the fornication statute] 
unenforceable.”79  The last cited conviction for fornication 
occurred in 1927,80 although it has been charged as recently as 
1986.81 
The Model Penal Code does not criminalize fornication,82 
although early in the code’s development the MPC Advisory 
Committee approved a fornication/cohabitation statute that made 
sexual behavior between unmarried, opposite-sex couples a 
misdemeanor if “[t]he behavior is open and notorious.”83  When it 
considered criminalizing fornication, the MPC Advisory Committee 
recognized that such provisions might present problems;84 it aimed 
to “identify certain categories of illicit intercourse which the code 
might reasonably undertake to punish”85 and encompass them in 
the MPC. 
The criminalization of fornication did not survive to the final 
version of the MPC.86  A ten-page comment to Article 213 sets out 
several reasons why the crime was eliminated.  First, simply 
contravening community norms of ethical behavior—the primary 
reason underlying fornication laws—is “an insufficient basis for 
imposition of penal sanctions” and criminalizes moral decisions 
best left to the individual.87  Fornication laws also involve 
enforcement techniques that are injurious to personal privacy 
interests and invade personal liberty.  The allocation of scarce law 
enforcement and judicial resources also supported the decision: “It 
makes more sense to concentrate on conduct directly harmful to 
 
 79.  In re Agerter, 353 N.W.2d 908, 915 (Minn. 1984). 
 80.  See State v. Cavett, 171 Minn. 222, 213 N.W. 920 (1927). 
 81.  See State v. Ford, 397 N.W.2d 875, 877 (Minn. 1986) (school teacher 
originally charged with one count of sodomy under Minn. Stat. § 609.294, subdiv. 
5, and one count of fornication under Minn. Stat. § 609.34 but convicted only of 
misconduct of a public officer). 
 82.  MODEL PENAL CODE art. 213 introductory note (Official Draft and Revised 
Comments 1980). 
 83.  MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.1(a) (Tentative Draft 4 1955). 
 84.  Id. § 207.1 cmt. I. 
 85.  Id. 
 86.  MODEL PENAL CODE art. 213 note on adultery and fornication 3 (Official 
Draft and Revised Comments 1980).  The requirement that the behavior occur 
“openly” is the language suggested for the 1963 revision, but that language did not 
make it into the final version of the statute.  ADVISORY COMM. ON REVISION OF THE 
CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 29, at 97–98.  
 87.  MODEL PENAL CODE art. 213 note on adultery and fornication 3. 
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others than to divert attention and resources to instances of private 
immorality.”88  While simply refusing to prosecute fornication could 
solve these issues, the problems of selective enforcement, private 
coercion, and disrespect for the criminal law would remain.89  
Finally, the drafters noted that, as more and more people see 
cohabitation and sex outside of marriage as the norm, 
criminalization will not equate to reducing or eliminating 
behavior:90  “[T]here is no reason to believe that maintaining 
symbolic condemnations of fornication and adultery will have any 
effect in inhibiting such conduct.”91 
The MPC drafters were correct, but Minnesota chose not to 
follow their lead.  In choosing to outlaw fornication, the Minnesota 
drafters relied on comments to the earlier, unapproved draft of the 
MPC that did criminalize fornication92 and simply creatively quoted 
comments advanced in that draft as their reasoning for doing so.93 
Minnesota’s code drafters believed that fornication statutes 
provide leverage against a putative father to provide support for a 
child and give prosecutors a bargaining chip in plea negotiations in 
rape cases.94  The advisory committee rationalized its decision to 
continue to criminalize fornication by claiming that “[t]he Code 
does not attempt to use the power of the state to enforce purely 
moral or religious standards.”95 
But this is precisely what the statute does: it criminalizes moral 
decisions best left to the individual.96  And so fornication remains a 
crime in our state. 
 
 
 88.  Id. 
 89.  Id.  
 90.  Id.  
 91.  Id. 
 92.  MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.1 (Tentative Draft 4 1955).  That draft 
required the behavior to be “open and notorious.”  Id. § 207.1(a).  The proposed 
criminal code likewise included the “openly” language, ADVISORY COMM. ON 
REVISION OF THE CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 29, at 98, but the “open and notorious” 
requirement did not survive to become law. 
 93.  ADVISORY COMM. ON REVISION OF THE CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 29, at 97–
98.  
 94.  Id. at 98. 
 95.  ADVISORY COMM. ON REVISION OF THE CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 29, at 98. 
 96.  MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.6, note on adultery and fornication at 437 
(Official Draft and Revised Comments 1980). 
12
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 5 [2013], Art. 12
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol39/iss5/12
 
2013] DEVELOPMENT OF MINNESOTA’S CRIMINAL LAW 1453 
E. Clear and Understandable 
Another goal of the committee was to state the law in clear, 
simple, and understandable terms.97  Professor Pirsig nicely 
illustrated the difference when describing theft from a vending 
machine.  Before 1963, the law provided, in a single sentence: 
Any person who shall operate or cause to be operated or 
who shall attempt to operate or attempt to cause to be 
operated any automatic vending machine, coin-box 
telephone or other receptacle designed to receive lawful 
coin of the United States of America in connection with 
the sale, use or enjoyment of property or service, by 
means of a slug or of any false, counterfeited, mutilated 
or sweated coin, or by any means, method, trick or device 
whatsoever not lawfully authorized by the owner, lessee or 
licensee of such machine, coin-box telephone or 
receptacle; or who shall take, obtain or receive from or 
in connection with any automatic vending machine, coin-
box telephone or other receptacle designed to receive 
lawful coin of the United States of America in connection 
with the sale, use or enjoyment of property or service, 
any goods, wares, merchandise, gas, electric current, 
article of value, or the use or enjoyment of any telephone 
or telegraph facilities or service, or of any musical 
instrument, phonograph or other property, without 
depositing in and surrendering to such machine, coin-
box telephone or receptacle, lawful coin to the amount 
required therefore by the owner, lessee or licensee of 
such machine, coin-box telephone or receptacle, shall be 
guilty of a misdemeanor.98 
The proposed law, which encompassed the same conduct, was 
covered in the theft section in a much simpler, more 
understandable, and shorter sentence: “[Whoever intentionally] 
obtains property or services, offered upon the deposit of a sum of 
money or tokens in a coin or token operated machine or other 
receptacle, without making the required deposit or otherwise 
obtaining the consent of the owner [commits theft].”99 
 
 97.  ADVISORY COMM. ON REVISION OF THE CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 29. 
 98.  Pirsig, supra note 34, at 422–23 (quoting MINN. STAT. § 621.341 (1961)). 
 99.  Id. at 423 (quoting MINN. STAT. §609.52, subdiv. 2(7) (1965)). 
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F. Revise but Not Revolutionize 
Contrary to the drafters of the Model Penal Code, the advisory 
committee wanted to revise, but not revolutionize, criminal law.  
How the advisory committee dealt with the most serious offense, 
first-degree murder, illustrated its intent to refine, but not 
revolutionize, criminal law in Minnesota. 
Famously, the MPC eliminated the degrees of murder and 
rejected the idea that a premeditated murder was the most 
culpable type of murder.100  The advisory committee recognized 
that a premeditated murder might not be the most culpable type of 
murder: “The person who ponders, hesitates, and doubts, but 
under the stress of real or supposed circumstances, finally 
determines to commit the final act is a less dangerous individual 
and less to be condemned than one who without hesitation or 
inhibitions and without premeditation instantly but intentionally 
kills his victim.”101 
Moreover, the advisory committee also recognized that, as 
interpreted, premeditation had almost no meaning, “only that an 
interval of time was needed sufficient to form the intent.”102  Pirsig 
illustrated his point by citing, somewhat disdainfully, State v. Prolow, 
a decision from the Minnesota Supreme Court that sustained an 
instruction defining premeditation: 
[P]remeditation may be formed at any time, moment, or 
instant before the killing.  Premeditation means thought 
of beforehand for any length of time, no matter how 
short.  There need be no appreciable space of time 
between the intention of killing and the act.  They may be 
as instantaneous as the successive thoughts of the mind.103 
Nonetheless, the advisory committee put aside 
“[c]onsiderations of this kind” and elected to continue to 
distinguish between intentional and premeditated murders.104  But 
the advisory committee did attempt to “give some substance and 
meaning to the distinction between first and second degree 
murder” by defining premeditation as meaning “to consider, plan 
or prepare for, or determine to commit, the act referred to prior to 
 
 100.  See MODEL PENAL CODE § 201.6 cmt. 3 (Tentative Draft 9 1959). 
 101.  Pirsig, supra note 34, at 426. 
 102.  Id. 
 103.  98 Minn. 459, 461, 108 N.W. 873, 874 (1906). 
 104.  Pirsig, supra note 34, at 426 
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its commission.”105  By so defining premeditation, the advisory 
committee hoped that the severe sentence of life imprisonment for 
first-degree murder “[would] be reserved for those cases involving 
the murderer who lies in wait for his victim, or plans, calculates, 
and prepares to commit the fatal act.”106 
Alas, this is not what happened.  In fact, the Minnesota 
Supreme Court has held almost the opposite: “In a prosecution for 
murder in the first degree, extensive planning and calculated 
deliberation need not be shown by the prosecution.”107  According 
to the Minnesota Supreme Court, “[t]he requisite ‘plan’ to commit 
a first-degree murder can be formulated virtually instantaneously 
by a killer.”108  In reaching this conclusion, the Supreme Court 
cited State v. Prolow—the same case that Pirsig had used disdainfully 
to illustrate his point that there should be some substance and 
meaning to the distinction between first- and second-degree 
murder.109 
And, it is important to note, it is now even more crucial to 
distinguish between first- and second-degree murder.  The advisory 
committee attempted to import “substance and meaning” to the 
term premeditation because of the difference in punishment 
between the two offenses; first-degree premeditated murder carried 
a sentence of life in prison with the possibility of parole, while the 
punishment for second-degree intentional murder was for a term 
of not exceeding forty years.110 
Now, the sentence for first-degree premeditated murder is life 
without the possibility of parole111 while the term of imprisonment for 
second-degree murder is a little less than seventeen years.112 
 
 105.  MINN. STAT. § 609.18 (1965). 
 106.  Pirsig, supra note 34, at 426. 
 107.  State v. Flores, 418 N.W.2d 150, 155 (Minn. 1988). 
 108.  Id. (citing State v. Neumann, 262 N.W.2d 426, 430 (Minn. 1978)). 
 109.  Id. at 155–56. 
 110.  Pirsig, supra note 34, at 425. 
 111.  MINN. STAT. § 609.106, subdiv. 2 (2012). 
 112.  This is the presumptive term of imprisonment according to the 
Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines for a person with a criminal history score of 
zero.  See MINN. SENTENCING GUIDLELINES & COMMENTARY § 4.A (2012).  In 
Minnesota, a person serves two-thirds of his sentence in prison and one-third on 
parole; the actual presumptive sentence under the Guidelines would be twenty-five 
and one-half years.  Id.  The statutory sentence for second degree intentional 
murder is still for a term not exceeding forty years.  MINN. STAT. § 609.19, 
subdiv. 1. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Seventy-eight years passed between the adoption of the first 
criminal code in Minnesota and the passage of its revision in 1963.  
As the ‘63 revision reaches its fiftieth anniversary this year, it is wise 
to reflect upon the changes it made to Minnesota law, both where 
it improved the law and where we might seek to improve the 
criminal code as we look to the future. 
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